top of page
  • Writer's pictureMaxim Savinykh

Israel-Russian Relations and the Recent Escalation in the Middle East Conflict



On 7 October Hamas, also known as the “Islamic Resistance Movement”, started what they called “Operation al-Aqsa Flood”, which resulted in “targeted and deadly violence directed at civilians in Israel”(OHCHR 2023). More than 1200 Israelis and foreign nationals were killed, the vast majority of whom non-combatants, and around 250 others were captured and taken into Gaza (ZDF, 05.01.2024). Israel responded with “Operation Swords of Iron”, which up to the 5thJanuary 2024 led to the death of around 22600 Palestinians, most of whom non-Hamas members (ibid.).


Israel’s robust reaction to the attacks of the “Islamic Resistance Movement” and its comprehensive ground offensive still carries the risk of drawing countries like Iran, Syria, and Lebanon into the crisis and therefore regionalizing the conflict. Major powers, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, have actively become involved in the conflict, either through military-political support for Israel, like the United States, or through diplomatic efforts, as pursued by China and Russia. Although Moscow’s leverage has dramatically decreased after the beginning of its campaign in Ukraine in 2022, it still tries to contribute into the resolution of the conflict. Soon after the outbreak of the Gaza war, Vladimir Putin engaged in discussions with regional leaders such as Abbas, Raisi, Assad, al-Sisi and Netanyahu. While the practical outcome of these talks is questionable, Russia, as a permanent member of the UNSC, has a decisive impact on the organization’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


Thus, the above facts indicate that not only regional actors, like Jordan, Egypt and Qatar, but also non-regional ones, are actively seeking to influence the conflict in different means. Therefore, it is essential to make sense of non-Middle Eastern countries’ perceptions of current events, taking into account their broader positions on the Middle East conflict in general. This article specifically focuses on investigating Russia’s perspective on it.


From antisemitism to philosemitism? The image of Israel and Jewish communities in Russia.


Although many Jews participated in the establishment of the communist system in Russia and were among the elite of the Soviet leadership in the 1920s and 1930s, after the end of the Second World War, a form of state anti-Semitism started to develop in the country (Azadovskii and Egorov 2002; BBC News 2017). Primarily, this was manifested in the  barring Jews from positions that were at least to some extent connected to the state (EJE 1996). At the end of the 1940 “the campaign against rootless cosmopolitan” took place in the USSR. Although the authorities depicted this initiative as anti-Western, in reality it was mainly Jews who were targeted (Azadovskii and Egorov 2002). In this respect, Soviet Jewish community, especially its prominent public figures had to fear for their lives: some of them were imprisoned or even killed (BBC News 2018). Among the prominent instances, one can remember the case of Solomon Mikhoels, the chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during World War II, who was assassinated by the Soviet secret service.  In this context, so-called “the doctors’ plot” is also worth mentioning. At the end of the 1940s, 30 “doctors of the Kremlin”[1], 23 of whom were Jews, were arrested and labelled “terrorists” for being “associated with an international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization”(Fond Alexandra Yakovleva 2001).


In the years following Stalin’s demise, the situation began to change, but remnants of state and everyday anti-Semitism persisted. For instance, some universities or their departments had limitations on the admission of people with a Jewish background (Svoboda 2005). Yevgeny Yasin, a famous Russian educator and economist of Jewish origin, recalls his youth in the USSR: “When I wanted to apply to the Faculty of Geography, I was told that “at most only two Jews will be accepted, and one was already accepted, so you’d better not try to enter [this faculty]””(Svoboda 2018).


Scholars researching Jewish communities in the Soviet Union have not arrived at a definitive explanation for the roots of state-level anti-Semitism (BBC News 2017). Potential reasons include a tradition of anti-Semitism among the older generation who grew up in the Russian Empire. Additionally, the USSR’s support for Arab states in their conflicts with Israel, driven by the latter’s alignment with the United States, had a negative impact on the position of Jewish communities in the country. In 1967, Moscow severed relations with Tel-Aviv following the Six-Day War, further exacerbating the situation (Forbes 2023).


However, the late 1980s marked a significant turning point. Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union sought to normalize relations with the United States, prompting a reassessment of Moscow’s foreign policy worldwide. With the USSR no longer viewing the US as an enemy, hostilities with America’s allies also diminished. Therefore, in 1991, the Soviet Union reestablished diplomatic ties with Israel.


After the collapse of the USSR Moscow continued this trend. The first post-soviet foreign minister of Russia Andrey Kozyrev writes in his memoirs: “We had worked hard to improve relations with countries the Soviet Union had deemed to be enemies, in particular Israel, and had no intention of resurrecting the role as protector of their opponents. Yet the Palestinians might still be more willing to listen to us as traditional friends”(Kozyrev 2019, 261–62). That is, Russia tried to find the balance in its relations with Israel and Palestine (as well, as other Arab actors). And it was partially able to do so. For example, Moscow was one of the key co-sponsors in the peace process between Israel and Palestine in the 1990s, which led to the Oslo Accords. While Russia’s involvement was rather symbolic, it nevertheless underscored its commitment to maintaining a diplomatic equilibrium and fostering positive relations with both sides.


On the other hand, it seems that during this period the Kremlin’s sympathies were rather on the side of Israel. At this period Russian leadership could be called pro-western both in terms of their domestic identity and foreign policy(Talbott 2003; Kozyrev 2019). Israel, not only as a close ally of the US, but also as a highly developed country in terms of its economy, healthcare, science and social sphere was extremely attractive for Moscow. In the 1990s Alexey Vasiliev, a Russian scholar and thinker, commenting Kremlin’s perception of Israel said that “We [Russia] want commercial relations with Israel, as its economy is bigger than the economies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon put together”(Oded 2003, 154–55).


Moreover, the Russian Federation did not have the financial and military resources of the Soviet Union, which supplied the Arab countries with arms and economic aid, often on favorable terms. The cooperation between Moscow and the Arab countries, including Palestine, cooled down as a consequence of these new conditions. Lastly, the terrorist attacks that were occurring in Israel in the 1990s-2000s contributed to the pro-Israeli sentiment among Russians since Russia itself faced the problem of terrorism during the same years (Russel 2007). Local Russian media even reported that Hamas may be connected to the Chechen separatist movement (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2004; Svoboda 2006). Accordingly, “the Muslim world did not sympathize with it [Russia] in the Chechen wars, while Israel, on the contrary, looked like a valuable partner [for Moscow] in the fight against Islamists”(Baunov 2023).


Despite these shifts, Moscow’s policy toward Tel Aviv cannot be classified as unequivocally pro-Israeli. In the late 1990s, Russia altered its approach to the Middle East. This was primarily connected to Evgeny Primakov, who was appointed as a minister of foreign affairs in 1996. He spent most of his career studding the MENA-region as an academic and journalist (Kommersant 2001). His first actions as  head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were aimed at the revitalization of Russian relations with Arab actors, in particular the Palestine Liberation Organization and Syria with which Israel had acute conflict over the Golan heights during this time. In reality, however, Primakov was a strong supporter of Moscow’s multi-vector policy in the region. While reestablishing old ties with some Arab countries, he did not neglect relations with Israel. His arrival at the MFA was accompanied by the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as a prime-minister, who “was ready to see the Russian Federation  as a kind of counterweight to the US, especially when the administration’s policies have become increasingly dissonant with Israeli interests”(Zvyagelskaya 2014, 169). Furthermore, “The [Palestinian] Autonomy leadership wanted to see Moscow as an influential player that could force Israel to stop building new settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory and fulfil the terms of the agreements on phased withdrawal”(Zvyagelskaya 2014, 170).


Hence, the current Russia policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on attempts to build equally good relations with Tel Aviv and Arab actors and use this leverage for the easing of tensions between the sides, originates from the second part of the 1990s. Subsequently, during the 2000s after Hamas ascension to power in Gaza, Moscow decided to establish its representative office in West Jerusalem, which gave it more weight as a mediator. Furthermore, one cannot ignore the fact of Putin’s well-established contacts with Israeli prime-ministers from the 2000s onwards, primarily Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu (Rumer 2019). For example, Ehud Barack even said that “for Israel Putin is definitely the best person who ever sat in the Kremlin”(Russiamatters 2016). Lastly, Russian active support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime allowed Moscow and Tel Aviv to create a new important area of cooperation: The Kremlin helps or, at least, does not hinder Israel to destroy its enemies in Syria, in particular, pro-Iranian militias (Rumer 2019).


As a result, in the 2010s-2020s the problem of anti-Semitism lost its prevalence in Russia (Vedomosti 2016). While some surveys suggest the presence of “latent” or “passive” anti-Semitism, sociological research and reports from rabbis suggest that Russia offers a favorable environment for Jewish communities. The outcomes of research by domestic independent sociological organization “Levada Center” are illustrative: Jews are turned out to be the most acceptable minority in Russia[2](Levada 2022). Furthermore, Russians increasingly expressed philosemitism as negative attitudes towards Jews are often considered “indecent”(RBK 2018). 

In explaining the factors behind the comparatively lower prevalence of anti-Semitism in Russia, several elements are worth mentioning. One key aspect is the absence of official anti-Semitic policies initiated by the government (Levinson 2018). Additionally, positive diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv have played a role in fostering mutual understanding between ethnic Russians and Jews in Russia. Furthermore, the assimilation of Jewish communities into Russian society appears to be one more significant cause for a comparatively lower level of anti-Semitism in the country. The representatives of Jewish community are simply barely distinguishable from the “titular nation”[3]. This stands in stark contrast to labor migrants from Central Asia and domestic Muslim communities from the North Caucasus, who often visibly differ in appearance and retain distinct cultural characteristics. These differences can occasionally lead to tensions, especially during periods of economic decline (Kommersant 2021).

Nonetheless, it is important to say, that anti-Semitism still persists in various forms in Russia. For instance, some researchers distinguish between “active” and “passive” forms of anti-Semitism. The first one relates to the tangible actions (“manifestations of anti-Semitism”), such as discrimination at work or physical harm, directly impacting members of the Jewish community. In contrast, the latter, termed “anti-Semitic sentiment”, primarily involves negative statements. Particularly, the members of Jewish community can be labelled “arrogant”, “always focused on making money” and “self-seeking” people. Notably, “passive” anti-Semitism is considered relatively widespread in Russia.(Kommersant 2018). It is precisely this form of xenophobia that is considered to be relatively widespread in Russia. This way, according to Anti-Defamation League, 26% Russians share these views(ADL 2023).


Simultaneously, certain Russian regions, particularly those in the North Caucasus, manifest anti-Semitism in more violent expressions. A notable instance occurred in Dagestan in late October, where an enraged mob seized control of the airport on the scheduled day of an Israeli flight's arrival. Their intent was to apprehend and potentially harm members of the Jewish community. Fortunately, timely evacuation saved those arriving from Israel from harm. Sociologists attribute such incidents in Dagestan to persistent poverty, instability, a high percentage of individuals lacking higher education, stable employment, and clear life prospects. Despite a significant overall decline in anti-Semitism in Russia, researchers emphasize its latent existence within specific demographic segments. They suggest that under heightened instability in the country, this dormant prejudice may resurface in aggressive forms, particularly in regions facing harsh socio-economic challenges(Levada 2023).


Along with this, it is imperative to emphasize that the early 21st century marks a particularly favorable period for the Jewish community in Russia(Levada 2023). An important reason for this is the absence of state-sponsored anti-Semitism. Moreover, demographic dynamics play a crucial role. The generations that did not experience life in the Soviet Union, generally exhibit more tolerant views. In this regard, it is interesting that those young people who share liberal political attitudes tend to sympathy Israel in its conflict in Palestine. In addition to their growing up in a different environment, this is, apparently, can be explained that liberal/independent media often incline to the support of Tel Aviv what will be shown below. 

 


How Russian media frame the new war between Israel and Hamas


The study of how the media frames the recent conflict between Israel and Gaza holds significance for several reasons. Firstly, it provides insight into how the Kremlin perceives the crisis at an official level and how this perception might influence its actions. This is exemplified by the fact that Moscow’s actions against Kiev in 2022 followed a period of strong anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in state-controlled news outlets. As for independent media[4], they can help to understand what other perceptions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict exist in the country. This understanding could prove valuable in the event of a future change in the Russian government. As the previous section has demonstrated, shifts in the political system alongside the transformation of societal and elite attitudes during the 1980s and 1990s led to adjustments in Moscow’s policy in the Middle East.


To delve into this analysis, I examined Sunday news programs on Channel One Russia (Pervyj kanal) and Russia-1 (Rossiya-1) October 8th to 22nd, a period when the topic was particularly acute in the local media. Additionally, I examined broadcasts from November 26th to December 3rd, when the first phase of the war ended and a ceasefire was agreed. In addition, the first reports about Hamas attack on Israel were also taken. Viewers of these programs are mostly supporters of the current government or conservative-minded. The examination of these channels is valuable in terms of grasping Kremlin’s official position since they get guidelines how to narrate events from the Presidential Administration (Meduza 2022). Furthermore, they dominate in news agenda on Russian TV and influence on a significant part of the population. For example, one survey showed that more than 50%[5] of Russians trust central television (Radio Free Europe 2022; TASS 2023c). Even if these figures were artificially inflated by 10-20%, such figures are still high.


Along with this, I analyzed three issues each on the recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict by three independent media: TV Rain (Dozhd), Redakciya and Varlamov. While it is challenging to gauge their exact influence on Russian society, these media seem to have a following among the urban, well-educated class, many of whom hold critical or at least skeptical views of the current government. TV Rain, in particular, is often perceived as the main platform for Russian liberals and oppositionists. The number of their subscribers to these channels on YouTube varies from three and a half million to four and a half million people. Views of their videos on the situation in Israel and Palestine range from one million two hundred to four and a half million people.

As a result of analysis, I made two tables which show how state-run and independent media frame the recent escalation in the conflict between Israel and Gaza. There I tried to highlight the most covered topics from the reports. It also became clear during the analysis that state-run TV have a fairly consistent agenda. On this basis, the first table, without specific sub-sections, shows how state media covered events in Israel and Gaza. However, the agenda of independent media turned out to be diverse enough to make sub-sections for every three media.


(Table 1: original work by Maxim Savinykh)


Following the “ground operation” in Gaza, there was a shift in the rhetoric of Russian state-run media, with criticism directed towards the current Israeli cabinet, in general, and Benjamin Netanyahu, in particularly, for what was perceived as an overly harsh response. Specifically, they asserted that Tel-Aviv’s actions led to “the humanitarian catastrophe in the Palestinian enclave”(Vesti Nedeli 2023). However, right after highlighting the dire situation in Gaza, including footage of wounded and killed civilians, even children, the media pivoted to cover the fate of Israeli hostages held by Hamas.


Another slight difference from the first weeks of the conflict is that two major Russian TV channels occasionally had different interpretations on some events. For instance, “Russia-1” clearly stated that it was Hamas who broke the ceasefire(Vesti nedeli 2023a). On the other hand, “Channel 1” took a more cautious approach, only stating that “the parties accused each other of violating the ceasefire”(Voskresnoe Vremya 2023). Notable disparities were also observed within the coverage of “Russia-1” itself. The Israeli-based reporter subtly expressed sympathy for Israel, while the correspondent working alternately from Lebanon and Egypt[1] often aligned with interpretations prevalent in the Arab world. For instance, the Russian journalist in Israel mentioned that within the ceasefire framework, Tel Aviv released individuals “accused of terrorist activities”, whereas the Arab-based correspondent emphasized they were hostages(Vesti Nedeli 2023).


However, despite minor variations in state media coverage and a slight increase in criticism of Israel, there were no fundamentally new perspectives on the conflict. The two largest Russian television channels continued to strive for neutrality in their war coverage. Any criticism towards one side was counterbalanced by criticism of the other.


(Table 2: original work by Maxim Savinykh)


In the context of Russian politics, state-run and independent media usually represent polar narratives. It is paradoxical that in case of the war between Hamas and Israel, Reakciya (independent media) have some smarties with “Channel 1” and “Russia 1” (state-run) in the coverage of these events. In this regard, it is possible to suggest that if representatives of such views replace the current generation of Russian politicians, it is unlikely that Moscow’s policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will undergo significant changes.


Conversely, the situation with the watchers of TV Rain and Varlamov points to a different scenario. If liberals, who usually formulate their perception of politics from two above media, were to come to power in Russia, debates about the Moscow’s foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would resurface. In this case, it wouldn’t be surprising if Moscow adopted a more pro-Israeli stance. However, as of today, this prospect is not on the horizon. The Kremlin continues to prioritize good relations with all sides of the conflict: Israel, the Palestinian National Authority, and Hamas, as indicated by the analysis of state-run media during the recent crisis.

However, before moving on to the next part, this section should be concluded with one more argument. None of the above-mentioned media, which are the most important in the country, did take a rather pro-Palestinian stance. This seems to suggest that Russian foreign policy may be more pro-Israeli, as mentioned, but it certainly cannot turn out to be pro-Palestinian. Although such a conclusion may seem paradoxical in the midst of the Soviet past, it is logical given the transformation that Russian society and elites have undergone in recent decades.

 


The official reaction of Russia and Israel's disappointment


When discussing the Kremlin’s desire to influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one key factor is Russia’s historical perception of itself as a major global power. Even during the challenging 1990s, Moscow actively sought a role in the peace process between Israel and Palestine. This engagement boosted Russia’s sense of importance and confidence, a sentiment often found in both former colonies and large developed countries. Similarly, China’s pursuit of international influence appears motivated by the same factors.


In this regard, it is possible to say that the Russian stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also guided by Moscow’s opposition toWashington. It has already been shown above that Russia’s state-run media blame the US for the outbreak of the crisis. At the BRICS online summit in November, Vladimir Putin bluntly stated that it is precisely because of the United States’ “monopolization of mediation functions” that neither Palestine can establish its state nor Israel can ensure its security(RAPSI 2023). In practice, this means that Moscow and Beijing block Washington's resolutions in the UN. . By criticizing the US over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict among “non-Western” states, the Kremlin seems to be trying to find another, albeit situational, reason to unite with them.


Along with that, Kremlin’s intention to be a major player in the new conflict between Israel and Hamas may also have another reason. After 2014 Russia found itself more isolated from the Western countries. However, Moscow’s active participation in the Syrian crisis prompted Washington and Brussels to enter into dialogue with it. Although the Kremlin has much less leverage in the current Middle East conflict, it would probably like to use it for the same purpose as in 2014. However, Vladimir Putin’s initial public reaction (or lack thereof) did not help matters.

After the conflict’s outbreak, Putin refrained from commenting for the first three days. His first public statement occurred during a meeting with the Iraqi prime minister, where he expressed regret over the escalation and criticized the US’s role in the Middle East (TASS 2023b). By the 14th of October Putin’s rhetoric became almost identical to that of the Russian state media on the conflict: on the one hand, the president expresses words of sympathy and condolences for Israel, and on the other, he speaks of the unacceptability of such a harsh reaction from Tel Aviv (Vedomosti 2023; Kremlin.ru 2023), which aims at keeping a balanced stance. However, this delayed reaction by the Russian leadership, as well as its commitment to maintain its contacts with Hamas, provoked a storm of protest in Israeli society, forcing the presidential spokesman to explain to journalists that the Kremlin is committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and had even toughened its position on the hostages, including Russian citizens (Interfax 2023). This tension in the media space has sparked talk of a souring of relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv (The Guardian 2023).


Lastly, Israel was indignant by the visit of Hamas delegation to Russia at the end of October. Israeli foreign ministry stated that they “consider the invitation of Hamas leaders to Moscow as an unworthy step”(TASS 2023a). As well as trying to maintain, or at least assert, its influence in the region, the Kremlin also sought to secure the release of Israeli hostages with Russian citizenship. However, the success of this initiative remains uncertain. As of early December, only three out of the nine hostages with Russian passports had been freed. Notably, depsite Russia’s claims in the opposite direction, two of them likely returned as part of a general exchange.. This inference is supported by the fact that the released hostages consist of an elderly woman and her daughter (previous exchanges have included exactly women and children). However, a twenty-five-year-old man appears to have been distinctly released as part of the Russia-Hamas negotiations, as men of other nationalities have not been part of the exchanges.

 


So, did Russia and Israel have a falling out after all?


The above actions of Moscow have become an ordeal for its relations with Tel-Aviv. However, these events should not be overestimated. While unpleasant, these episodes are unlikely to have a profound effect on bilateral ties between the two sides. The importance that Jewish communities hold in Russia, as indicated in the first part of this article, is an important motivation for Israel not to quarrel with Moscow. In the event of bad relations between the parties, it is difficult to predict in what position the Jewish communities living in Russia will find themselves in.


Furthermore, the Kremlin’s contacts with other Middle Eastern actors, particularly Damascus and Tehran, are imperative for Israel. It has been mentioned above that Moscow and Tel Aviv have established a good coordination in Syria. If this cooperation is deteriorated, the situation on the Northern border of Israel will become more tense. In addition, Putin’s “phone diplomacy” with major regional actors, including Damascus and Tehran, apparently aims at preventing them from being drawn into the new conflict between Israel and Hamas. At the same time, it should be said that it is currently unknown whether Moscow is able to make any real impact here. Where the Kremlin could help is in negotiations with Hamas over the release of hostages with Russian passports. Since Moscow has some options on this issue, albeit very limited ones, it seems that the arrival of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Russia will not have bad consequences for the current Israeli government's attitude towards the Kremlin. Notably, criticism of Russia for this event has only been voiced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with Benjamin Netanyahu refraining from commenting. It is possible that he was informed in advance by the Russian side about such a visit. Simultaneously, the visit of Hamas to Moscow might be remembered by critics of the current government, potentially causing lasting negative effects on future Russia-Israeli relations. In other words, it might pose a challenge for the next Prime Minister to justify the continued friendship with Moscow, especially given that it hosted Israeli enemies during the conflict with them.


Along with that, it is possible to say that previous relations heavily dependent on Putin’s connections, first, with Sharon, and then with Netanyahu. This factor, apparently, does seem to matter. According to Russian journalists who could observe the contacts between Netanyahu and Putin, claimed that their personal chemistry contributes to better understanding between the two states (Pervoe Radio 2023). But this factor should not be overestimated. Over the past two decades, Israel has had prime ministers, albeit not for such a long period of time, who did not have a special relationship with the Russian leadership. However, bilateral ties between the two countries have not been affected in any way.


Nevertheless, all what have been said above, relates to the rational component of politics. However, Israeli society is heated to the breaking point due to the attack of Hamas. In this regard, if resentment of Russia’s position among the Jewish population doesn’t not cease, then this could have a negative impact on bilateral relations. The exact influence is currently uncertain and requires expertise in Israeli domestic politics. Speaking about Moscow’s intentions, one can confidently say that it is in no way interested in the deterioration of its relations with Tel Aviv and a regionalization of the conflict.


[1] The doctors who treated high-ranking members of the Communist Party of the USSR

[2] In addition to Jews, the survey included people from Africa, Central Asia and China, as well as Chechens, Ukrainians and Gypsies.

[3] The Russian language exhibits a distinct division when referring to Jews. When denoting ethnicity, Jews are called 'evrei,' while for religious affiliation, the term used is 'iudei'. Given that the majority of Jews in Russia are not religious, this distinction primarily pertains to their ethnicity.

[4] Independent media are those that are financially independent of the state

[5] Survey data ranges from 53% to 59%

[6] Due to security reasons, “Russia 1” doesn’t have a reporter in Gaza and covers the events there from Lebanon and Syria.


Maxim Savinykh is an independent analyst writing for Ishtar MENA Analytics from St.Petersburg. He is currently finishing his master's in Comparative Politics of Eurasia at the Higher School for Economics in St. Petersburg. His most recent research focuses on Iran's nuclear aspirations.



Cited Work


ADL. 2023. ‘The ADL GLOBAL 100: An Index of Antisemitism’. 2023. https://global100.adl.org/map.

Azadovskii, Konstantin, and Boris Egorov. 2002. ‘From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of the “Anti-Cosmopolitan” Campaigns on Soviet Culture’. Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (1): 66–80. https://doi.org/10.1162/152039702753344834.

Baunov, Alexander. 2023. ‘Nalozhenie vojn. Kak Rossiya vospolzuetsya obostreniem na Blizhnem Vostoke’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90794.

BBC News. 2017. ‘“Russkie evrei” Leonida Parfenova. Mnenie istorika’. BBC News Русская служба, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-39308558.

BBC News 2018. ‘Stalin i evrei: 70 let razgroma Evrejskogo antifashistskogo komiteta’. BBC News Русская служба, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-46225286.

BBC News. 2023. ‘What Is Hamas and Why Is It Fighting with Israel in Gaza?’ BBC News, 7 October 2023, sec. Middle East. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67039975.

Dozhd, dir. 2023a. Rakety ATACMS Ispugali Putina. Arabskij Mir i Izrail: Na Poroge Vojny. Ohota Kremlya Za Advokatami. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEXfDgJhLws.

Dozhd, dir. 2023b. Vojna v Izraile: Otvechaem Na Glavnye Voprosy. Pomog Li HAMAS Putinu. Kak Vlasti Podnimayut Kurs Rublya. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7fSBz90xNvk.

EJE. 1996. ‘Sovetskij Soyuz. Evrei v Sovetskom Soyuze v 1945–53 gg.’ Электронная еврейская энциклопедия ОРТ. 1996. https://eleven.co.il/jews-of-russia/history-in-ussr/15418/.

Fond Alexandra Yakovleva. 2001. ‘“Arest Gruppy Vrachej-Vreditelej”. Soobshenie Gazety “Pravda”’. 2001. https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/69982.

Forbes. 2023. ‘Sovetskie grazhdane, a ne evrei: pochemu v SSSR prakticheski ne govorili o Holokoste’. Forbes.ru. 5 May 2023. https://www.forbes.ru/forbeslife/488839-sovetskie-grazdane-a-ne-evrei-pocemu-v-sssr-prakticeski-ne-govorili-o-holokoste.

Interfax. 2023. ‘Kreml zayavil o bezrezultatnosti kontaktov s Izrailem i palestincami po zalozhnikam’. Interfax.ru. 24 October 2023. https://www.interfax.ru/world/927302.

Kommersant. 2001. ‘Evgenij Primakov zagovoril proarabski’. 20 June 2001. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/271256.

Kommersant. 2018. ‘Otvety na evrejskij opros’. Коммерсантъ. 8 September 2018. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3733242.

Kommersant. 2021. ‘Nenashih byut’. Коммерсантъ. 25 October 2021. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5050473.

Kozyrev, Andrei. 2019. ‘The Firebird: The Elusive Fate of Russian Democracy (Russian and East European Studies): 9780822945925: Kozyrev, Andrei, McFaul, Michael: Books’. 2019. https://www.amazon.com/Firebird-Elusive-Russian-Democracy-European/dp/0822945924.

Kremlin.ru. 2023. ‘Vstrecha s predstavitelyami religioznyh obedinenij’. Президент России. 25 October 2023. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72593.

Leatherby, Lauren. 2023. ‘Gaza Civilians, Under Israeli Barrage, Are Being Killed at Historic Pace’. The New York Times, 25 November 2023, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/25/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-death-toll.html.

Levada. 2022. ‘Ksenofobiya i migranty’. 24 January 2022. https://www.levada.ru/2022/01/24/ksenofobiya-i-migranty/.

Levada. 2023. ‘Kto vinovat: kak svyazany sobytiya v Dagestane i obshij uroven antisemitizma v Rossii’. 1 November 2023. https://www.levada.ru/2023/11/01/kto-vinovat-kak-svyazany-sobytiya-v-dagestane-i-obshhij-uroven-antisemitizma-v-rossii/.

Levinson, Alexey. 2018. ‘Ob Otnoshenii k Evreyam v Sovremennoj Rossii’. 2018. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ob-otnoshenii-k-evreyam-v-sovremennoi-rossii/viewer.

Meduza. 2022. ‘“Standing up for the Oppressed” The Kremlin’s Newest Propaganda Guide Suggests Likening Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine to the First World War’. Meduza. 2022. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/08/04/standing-up-for-the-oppressed.

Middle East Eye. 2023. ‘Gaza Death Toll Passes 15,000, Palestinian Official Says’. Middle East Eye. 2023. https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/gaza-death-toll-passes-15000-palestinian-official-says.

OHCHR. 2023. ‘Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territory: UN Experts Deplore Attacks on Civilians, Call for Truce and Urge International Community to Address Root Causes of Violence’. OHCHR. 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/10/israeloccupied-palestinian-territory-un-experts-deplore-attacks-civilians.

Pervoe Radio, dir. 2023. VOJNA V IZRAILE. Est Li ‘Russkij Sled’? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ab8vKRMGMqg.

Radio Free Europe. 2022. ‘Televizionnaya propaganda imeet podavlyayushee vliyanie’. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 17 May 2022. https://www.idelreal.org/a/31852917.html.

RAPSI. 2023. ‘Putin: palestino-izrailskij konflikt nerazreshim vsledstvie sabotazha reshenij OON’. РАПСИ. 21 November 2023. https://rapsinews.ru/international_news/20231121/309402382.html.

RBK. 2018. ‘Levada-centr rasskazal ob otsutstvii problemy antisemitizma v Rossii’. РБК. 6 September 2018. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/06/09/2018/5b8f9fbe9a7947194b7a482a.

Redakciya, dir. 2023a. Chto Proishodit v Palestinskom Anklave Posle Atak Na Izrail? / Redakciya. Kontekst. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7bBe1R4mso.

Redakciya. 2023b. ‘Zhurnalist «Redakcii» Peredaet Iz Izrailya’. 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ijj_lWeekEY.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2004. ‘HAMAS sotrudnichaet s chechencami?’ Российская газета. 2 October 2004. https://rg.ru/2004/10/02/xamas-chechen.html.

Rumer, Eugene. 2019. ‘Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233.

Russel, John. 2007. ‘Chechnya - Russia’s “War on Terror” - 1st Edition - John Russell - Rou’. 2007. https://www.routledge.com/Chechnya---Russias-War-on-Terror/Russell/p/book/9780415491778.

Russiamatters. 2016. ‘Putin as Bismarck: Ehud Barak on West’s Russia Blind Spots, the Middle East and More | Russia Matters’. 2016. https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/putin-bismarck-ehud-barak-wests-russia-blind-spots-middle-east-and-more.

Svoboda. 2005. ‘Diskriminacii pri postuplenii v vysshie uchebnye zavedeniya Sovetskogo Soyuza’. Радио Свобода, 2005, sec. Главные разделы. https://www.svoboda.org/a/126672.html.

Svoboda. 2006. ‘HAMAS - nadezhda mirovogo terrorizma ili budushij partner’. Радио Свобода, 2006, sec. Главные разделы. https://www.svoboda.org/a/131797.html.

Svoboda. 2018. ‘Poprobujte Dogovoritsya! Yevgeny Yasin’. 2018. https://www.svoboda.org/a/29165519.html.

Talbott, Strobe. 2003. ‘The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy: Talbott, Strobe: 9780812968460: Amazon.Com: Books’. 2003. https://www.amazon.com/Russia-Hand-Memoir-Presidential-Diplomacy/dp/0812968468.

TASS. 2023a. ‘Izrail Osudil Vizit Delegacii HAMAS v Rossiyu’. TACC. 2023. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19127851.

TASS.  2023b. ‘Putin Nazval Obostrenie v Izraile Primerom Provala Politiki SShA Na Blizhnem Vostoke’. TACC. 2023. https://tass.ru/politika/18963297.

TASS. 2023c. ‘VCIOM: Rossiyane Bolshe Vsego Doveryayut Centralnomu Televideniyu i Ne Veryat Socsetyam’. TACC. 2023. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/16997729.

The Guardian. 2023. ‘Hamas Attack Exposes Deteriorating Ties between Russia and Israel’. The Guardian, 12 October 2023, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/12/hamas-attack-exposes-deteriorating-ties-between-russia-and-israel.

Varlamov. 2023a. ‘HAMAS: S Kem Voyuet Izrail? | Sektor Gaza, Svyazi s Rossiej, Vliyanie Egipta i Dengi Iz Katara’. 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=avWcwwN-7cs.

Varlamov.2023b. Konflikt v Izraile: Ataka HAMASa, Rasskazy Ochevidcev i Mobilizaciya | Udary Po Sektoru Gaza. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dqfMtyI_mE.

Vedomosti. 2016. ‘«Evrejskij vopros» v Rossii utratil prezhnyuyu ostrotu’. Ведомости. 31 October 2016. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/11/01/663147-evreiskii-vopros-utratil-ostrotu.

Vedomosti. 2023. ‘Chto znachat slova Putina o prave Izrailya na oboronu’. Vedomosti. 14 October 2023. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/10/13/1000537-putin-izrailya-hamas.

Vesti nedeli. 2023a. ‘Vesti Nedeli. Efir Ot 03.12.2023’. Smotrim.Ru. 2023. https://smotrim.ru/video/2724033.

Vesti Nedeli, dir. 2023. Vesti Nedeli s Dmitriem Kiselevym Poslednij Vypusk Rossiya 1 Pryamoj Efir Smotret Onlajn 26.11.2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TlC64zv17GM.

Vesti nedeli. 2023b. ‘Вести Недели. Эфир От 08.10.2023. Английские, Испанские, Немецкие и Французские Субтитры’. Smotrim.Ru. 8 October 2023. https://smotrim.ru/video/2694682.

Vesti nedeli.2023c. ‘Vesti Nedeli. Efir Ot 22.10.2023’. Smotrim.Ru. 22 October 2023. https://smotrim.ru/video/2701905.

Voskresnoe Vremya, dir. 2023. Vypusk programmy «Voskresnoe Vremya» v 21:00 ot 03.12.2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-12-03/466329-vypusk_programmy_voskresnoe_vremya_v_21_00_ot_03_12_2023.

Voskresnoe vremya. 2023a. ‘Vypusk programmy «Voskresnoe vremya» v 21:00 8 oktyabrya 2023 goda. Novosti. Pervyj kanal’. 1tv.ru. 8 October 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2023-10-08/21:00.

Voskresnoe vremya.2023b. ‘Vypusk programmy «Voskresnoe vremya» v 21:00 15 oktyabrya 2023 goda. Novosti. Pervyj kanal’. 1tv.ru. 15 October 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2023-10-15/21:00.

Voskresnoe vremya.2023c. ‘Vypusk programmy «Voskresnoe vremya» v 21:00 22 oktyabrya 2023 goda. Novosti. Pervyj kanal’. 1tv.ru. 22 October 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2023-10-22/21:00.

Vremya. 2023. ‘Vypusk programmy «Vremya» v 21:00 7 oktyabrya 2023 goda. Novosti. Pervyj kanal’. 1tv.ru. 7 October 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2023-10-07/21:00.

Zvyagelskaya, Irina. 2014. Blizhnevostochnyj Klinch : Konflikty Na Blizhnem Vostoke i Politika Rossii. Moscow. https://book.ivran.ru/book?id=24.

99 views0 comments

Recent Posts

See All

Comments


bottom of page